Commentators often have mistakenly assumed that in Pareto's scheme all nonlogical theories are viewed equally as only reflections or manifestations of underlying propensities. This, however, is not the case. He was careful to dis- tinguish between 1) pseudo-scientific theories and 2) "theories transcending experience."

In the first, Pareto argued, we deal with theories that pretend to scientific status but demonstrably fail to meet the test of scientific evidence. Such theories, he believed, are ultimately anchored in biological needs, drives, and propensities and are directly explainable in terms of the residues underlying them. They are, in fact, rationalizations. When it comes to "theories transcending experi- ence," religious theories, for example, Pareto argued differently. These do not pretend to have scientific status; it is pointless, therefore, to show that they depart from scientific standards. Such theories represent, instead, cultural values and the cultural dimension in human action. They are value-attitudes. When Pareto says that residues are "manifested" in pseudo-scientific theories, he seems to mean that these indicate the presence of such residues, and testify to their power of deception. But when he talks about the manifestation of residues, in theories transcending experience, he seems to mean that they are "manifested" or expressed in symbolic ritual behavior.

Pareto was well aware that scientific method could not in itself determine the ends of human action. "A society determined exclusively by 'reason' does not and cannot exist . . . because the data of the problem that presumably is to be solved by logico-experimental reasoning are entirely unknown." Hence, the ends, as distinct from the means, of human action find expression in "theories transcending experience." To be sure, these can ultimately be traced to the operation of residues, and, in the last analysis, to basic human sentiments; yet Pareto seems to have recognized that the human quest for "meaning" as it manifests itself in "theories transcending experience" must be a basic datum for any analysis of social systems. He did have a power- ful tendency to "reduce" such quests to underlying factors, yet he was also eager to point to the indispensability of symbolic elements for maintaining a social system and for directing the goals of human action. Although his tendency to "debunk" informs a good deal of his work, he was by no means oblivious to the central importance of the normative sphere. This may be the reason he has been quoted to say that he hoped his Treatise would not be read too widely, since this would help undermine necessary moral values.

From Coser, 1977:394