In his efforts to highlight those aspects of a social system that are not amenable to economic investigation and hence require complementary analysis on a specifically sociological plane, Pareto was led to make the key distinction between the maximum utility of and the maximum utility for a community. The latter is the point where each individual has attained the maximum pos- sible private satisfaction. The former refers to the maximum utility of the group or society as a whole, not of individuals. Only the second type can be treated by the economist; he can consider only the wants of individuals who are dissimilar and whose satisfactions therefore cannot be added up to yield a measure of the maximum utility for the entire group or society. "In pure economics a community cannot be regarded as a person." In contrast, in sociology, Pareto argues, "[A community] can be considered, if not as a per- son, at least as a unity.'' The maximum utility to a society can be analyzed sociologically, and may not necessarily coincide with the maximum satisfaction of the wants of its individual members. What is more, there may well exist divergencies between utilities accruing to a total social system and maximum satisfactions of sub-groupings, such as social classes. For example, in regard to an increase in population, the utility of the community and the utility for the community may well diverge.

If we think of the utility of the community as regards prestige and mili- tary power, we will find it advisable to increase population to the fairly high limit beyond which the nation would be diminished and its stock decay. But if we think of the maximum utility for the community, we find a limit that is much lower. Then we have to see in what proportions the various social classes profit by the increase in prestige and military power, and in what different proportion they pay for their particular sacrifices.

According to Pareto, the distinction between utility of and utility for a community is often deliberately obfuscated for manipulative purposes by ruling groups who make it appear as if subject individuals or sub-groups would benefit from certain measures when this is in fact by no means the case.

The ruling classes oftentimes show a confusion of a problem of maximum utility of the community and a problem of maximum utility for the com- munity. They [try] to make the "subject" classes believe that there is an in- direct utility which, when properly taken into account, turns the sacrifice re- quired of them into a gain. . . . In reality, in cases such as these, nonlogical impulse can serve to induce the subject classes to forget the maximum of individual utility, and work for the maximum utility of the community, or merely of the ruling classes.

Or, to give another example, maximum wealth may be considered a prime goal for the society as a whole, but this may not coincide with the satisfaction of some of its members and may create great inequalities and major pockets of poverty in the society. Inversely, a state in which the greatest number of individuals attain the maximum of satisfaction may mark a point of societal decay and national decline.

By making his distinction between the utility for and the utility of a com- munity, Pareto moved from classical liberal economics, where it was assumed that total benefits for a community simply involved a sum total of the benefits derived by each individual member ("the greatest happiness of the greatest number"), to a sociological point of view in which society is treated as a total unit and sub-groups or individuals are considered from the viewpoint of their contribution to the overall system as well as in terms of their peculiar wants and desires. System needs and individual or sub-group needs are distinguished.

It must be stressed that what is considered to be of maximum utility to society as a whole in fact involves subjective judgments rather than objective assessments. Those who run the affairs of the society, the governing elite, will determine what benefits the society as a whole needs, and they will decide this in terms of their own interests, desires, values, and beliefs.

Pareto's thought converged with that of Durkheim. Both rejected utilitarian and individualistic notions and stressed the need to consider the requirements of social systems, qua systems. They diverged, however, insofar as Durkheim believed that system needs could be determined objectively and scientifically, whereas Pareto contended that judgments of such needs derived from the de- sires and propensities, as well as the values and norms of those who were in command.

From Coser, 1977:400-401.