Merton’s final seminal work was in the form of a theoretical piece, "Social Structure and Anomie," published in the American Sociological Review (1938). In it, he sought an explanation for deviant behavior through an explication and refinement of Durkheim’s conception of anomie. It is not our purpose to include in this book on theories of society the more specialized forms of theoretical sociology. However, this explanation of deviance is centered first of all at the societal level. Please recall that Merton, as had his historical mentor, wrote in a context of crisis and change. And, as did Durkheim, Merton focused on deviance as a consequence of structural disorganization.

In this classification of anomic deviance, Merton explored the relationship between cultural goals and the structural means to achieve those goals. For this sociologist, when success goals were universally imposed on the members of society while the means to achieve them were restricted for some members, deviance could be expected on a broad scale. As evident in the following schemata, it is the type of consistency or inconsistency between goals and means that leads to either conformity or to one of the four "types" of anomic deviance. (See Figure 5.1.)

From Merton’s scheme we can understand that the conformist internalizes the common success goals but also has access to the approved means to realize the goals. For the other relationships, a condition of goals—means dysjunction exists. The innovator role manifests the adoption of disvalued means (for example, theft) to realize success. The ritualist follows the rules obsessively but loses sight of the overall goals (for example, the inflexible bureaucrat). The retreatist abandons both success and goals and the means to realize them (for example, the drug addict). The rebel rejects both the traditional goals and means, but envisions new ones as the basis for a new social order. It should be stressed that Merton saw deviance not in terms of personality types but as role responses to different forms of dysjuction.

Merton’s theoretical contribution to the field of deviance serves as a window to his later efforts to construct a system of functional analysis. Here he demonstrated his proclivity for intensive study of a more limited theoretical puzzle. Yet it is obvious that he sought to explain the puzzle of deviance in the conceptual language of sociology. Like Durkheim, Merton avoided pathological interpretations based on either biological or psychological variables.

In this theoretical matrix, actors in a social system are constrained by happenings in the broader sphere of society. Deviant roles are not created by willful intent or intimate experiences. They occur as patterned responses to a breakdown between universal expectations (to be successful) and the availability of approved methods to achieve those ends. Or in Merton’s words, when a society professes that every office boy can become president, while the avenues to such aspirations are socially limited, the stage is set for deviance on a broad scale.

As with other order theorists, Merton came to focus in his later work on the social consequences of patterned, predictable, and recurring phenomena (such as societies, cultures, organizations, and groups). He also conceived of elements within larger wholes in terms of their contribution to the adjustment of a given system (Merton, 1968: 104). However, clearly evident in this early work in the theory of deviance are distinctive properties that were carried throughout his career.

First of all, Merton focused on a more modest theoretical problem (in this case, that of deviance). Second, his argument held that cultural ideals might in unintended fashion serve as a source of unexpected role behavior. And finally, he noted that many are not afforded the legitimate means to reach universal goals. Thus, he intimated that not all existing practices contribute to the positive integration of the total society.

By 1949 it was obvious that Merton would attempt to make over functionalism. And in so doing, he came to modify the central premises of this theoretical system (1968: 73-138). Please understand that traditional functionalism, whether contained in the organicism of the nineteenth century, or early cultural anthropology, or the emerging systems approach in sociology (see Chapter 7), conceived of society and culture in terms of unified wholes. Therefore, all customs, practices, and arrangements were seen to contribute to the integration of the existing order. Merton took issue, arguing instead that such a tightly drawn conception might be useful to understand more homogeneous and smaller societies but that the complex and heterogeneous order seldom reflects such perfect integration. For Merton, findings about the tightly knit and traditional society could not be uncritically generalized to all societies.

Traditional functionalism also holds that whatever exists at a structural or cultural level serves a positive function, a socially necessary purpose, or else it would not exist. Merton was again to demur, arguing that the consequences of existing social practices are not uniform for society. Thus, practices might be positive, negative, or irrelevant for the social order in question. For example, it might be argued that paying less for women’s work has positive functions for the employers paying their salary and for some men who are paid more to do comparable work. However, the practice might prove to be dysfunctional not only for women but for a society in which poverty is rapidly becoming feminized.

In a slightly different vein, Merton theorized that certain rituals or practices have no important consequences for an existing social order. Such may be mere holdovers from history. For example, groups such as the Women’s Christian Temperance Union are today merely shells of once powerful social movements. Hence, this organization might be considered nonfunctional for the society at large.

Finally, traditional functionalism also embraces the fallacy of indispensability or absolute necessity. Every part that exists in a societal or cultural system is seen as essential and representing the only alternative. For Merton, however, alternative practices, customs, and forms are often viable. Changing the part therefore, does not presage the collapse of the whole, and certain parts of a societal system can be eliminated or modified. Building upon this reformulation of functionalism as a system of analysis, Merton offered other points of distinction.

First of all, it is not enough to analyze the manifest or apparent functions of social elements. Modern functionalism must explore the latent or hidden consequences of these repetitive and enduring patterns. For example, one might argue that poverty is manifestly dysfunctional for society (as well as the poor) for a number of obvious reasons. However, if we explore the latent consequences of poverty, we might find a number of hidden benefits and beneficiaries.

Such an approach is evident in an essay by an urban sociologist who does not favor poverty but seeks to explore its "positive functions" (Gans, 1972). Some of these "benefits" are:

1. Poverty ensures the "dirty " work is done through maintaining a class of people to fill the menial, temporary, dead-end jobs.
2. Poverty creates jobs for such people as welfare workers, criminal justice personnel, and pawnshop owners (among others).
3. The poor can be identified and used as scapegoats for alleged or actual deviance to define and uphold dominant norms.
4. The needy, particularly those disabled or otherwise incapacitated, allow us to evidence pity, compassion, and charity toward the "less fortunate" (as long as they are truly needy and deserving).
5. Those in want help the affluent through enhancement of their self-image (knowing one is better off than other), and by means of their systematic exclusion from competition for the better jobs. They also provide a purpose for philanthropic organizations and the bureaucracy designed to help them.
6. The poor have historically built civilizations through slave labor, and through their poetry and music (jazz, blues, spirituals, and "country") have enriched the lives of the nonpoor.
7. Finally, the poor absorb the costs of progress (as with urban renewal) and share disproportionately in the costs of welfare.

Second, functional analysis can be carried out at various levels. One might examine the total society or culture, or opt to study less general but enduring formal organizations (such as bureaucracies), or perhaps even family units. Each such example reflects a different plateau within social order.

Third, Merton also sought to reconcile social determinism and individual volition (Stinchcombe, 1975). He did so by arguing that the motivated actor selects from among institutionalized patterns of choice. In effect he acknowledged that the human condition does not revolve on a changeless normative axis. Everywhere, human beings confront conditions of ambivalence where the rules are often in conflict.

Fourth, early organists often conceived of society as a self-correcting system, evolving toward perfection. Merton, while not abandoning the emphasis on adaptation, considered this a myth. Societies contain incongruities and contradictions, ambiguities and confusion. In his revision of functionalism, Merton sought to make its logic fit the old nemesis of change.

Fifth, Merton’s multifaceted conception of function introduced a sociological form of trade-off or net balance. By considering both the (positive) functions and (negative) dysfunctions of social practices, it is possible to appreciate, if not resolve, the complexities of social life.

Sixth, the contributions of this sociologist to theories of the "middle range" can be found in works on deviance, bureaucratic life, mass communication, professional socialization, and other substantive issues. Some of his more important conceptions include the reference group and the self-fulfilling prophecy. By means of the former, he accounted for the relationship between group orientation and self-appraisal. Through the later, he demonstrated that a widely publicized and believed social prediction may contribute to the very behavior that confirms the prophecy (Perdue, 1986, pp. 84-88).