The theoretical sociology of Robert K. Merton is best conceptualized as a form of neofunctionalism developed in response to the criticisms often leveled at is logical base. However, this effort leaves many substantive points untouched, while several of its reform raise new questions.

To begin, Merton’s work may be an attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable. For example, the effort to accommodate change occurs in a theoretical matrix primarily concerned with adjustment and order. This means that such theory can conceive of change only in the limited sense of tempering or eliminating certain dysfunctional parts of the whole, a process that leaves the overall societal system intact. It is clear that Merton’s revision of functionalism does not address change at the societal or institutional level. His focus was on adjustments that are consistent with the existing nature of the social system. Thus the underlying dilemma of functionalist (as well as organist and systems) theory remains untouched. In creating a portrait of order, societal and cultural patterns emerge as systems of mutually reinforcing elements. Substantive social change, specifically in the form of new institutions, is simply unexplained. It can only represent, as it did in Merton’s early sociology, a process pushed by those trapped in deviant roles.

There are other examples of the union of opposites. Merton sought to soften the Durkheimian image of the social actor as a passive respondent to impersonal and external forces. And he also acknowledged, as we have seen, the troublesome ambiguities of social life. However, these are qualifications of functionalism, not basic departures from its cardinal premises. Merton has not succeeded in freeing the actor from the subjugation of society. Nor have his concessions to societal ambivalence altered an emphasis on a well-integrated (if not perfectly integrated) normative order.

We should also recall that theoretical systems are, by definition, given to explanation. Merton’s reformulation of functionalism has rendered it a form of analysis. Whether this is a blessing or a curse depends upon one’s assumptions about sociology. As a system of explanation, functionalism seeks to answer the "why" of existing patterns by showing their purposes as well as their necessary consequences of the system as a whole. However, Merton’s reformulations (including the concept of dysfunction) encourage us to analyze the consequences of social practices while selectively rejecting their necessity or positive value. And this introduces an important problem. Traditional functionalists do have an answer, albeit a recurring one, for why a social or cultural phenomenon exists: It is necessary for the whole; it contributes to the adaptation of society. Merton’s logic, however, cannot account for why a dysfunctional element exists and still remain functionalist logic.

Finally, whatever the intentions or beliefs of its makers, functionalism lends itself to a conservative ideology. This is because the issues of conflict, inequality, state coercion, and other sources of disharmony and change simply do not fit the logic of this theory. Through purging functionalism of those premises that have drawn critical fire, Merton’s efforts may have created a more perfect conservatism. In the final (functionalist) analysis, he has cast society as a system that adapts and survives irrespective of some mistakes, normative ambiguity, and human volition.

Here the criticisms of functionalist thought are blunted in part through the forging of a conceptual elasticity. Functions become dysfunctions, the positive becomes negative, and society survives and adapts through trade-offs. By such means, social systems of whatever range become less rigid, more able to adapt while remaining the same (Perdue, 1986, pp. 88-89).