The conception of human nature that prevails in Ideology and Utopia is one of reason, mediation, and self-reflection. Indeed, "scientific critical self-awareness" on the part of those who work in the social sciences presupposes a certain attribute of the mind, an awareness of the relationship between social structure and systems of thought. This is not to argue that all those participating in social processes are doomed to falsify reality. Nor must they somehow suspend their value judgments and will to action. Instead, Mannheim held that to participate knowingly in social life presupposes that one can understand the often hidden nature of thought about society. Human beings have the potential for self-examination and contextual awareness. And only when these are understood can one have a comprehension of the formal object under study (Mannheim [1936] 1968:46-47...).

Simply put, there is a point in time, a moment of truth, when "the inner connection between our role, our motivations, and our type and manner of experiencing the world suddenly dawns upon us" ([1936] 1968:47). To be sure, some level of social determinism is real, for sociologists and all those who seek to unravel the puzzles of social life (including the puzzle of knowledge itself). None of us is free to exercise some metaphysical power of will.  However, to the extent that one uses the power of reason to gain insight into the sources of such determinism, to that extent a relative freedom from determinism is possible. It follows that this potential for simultaneously comprehending self, the socio-historical context, and the object to be analyzed must be realized (especially by sociologists). 

Certain assumptions concerning the nature of society remain constant throughout Mannheim's work. He returned again and again to the themes of conflict: of classes (and their systems of thought), of political movements, and of the necessary dissenting role of the intelligentsia. He addressed, as well shall see, the wider ground of the sociology of knowledge, but within that generality, he considered the specific question of ideological structure. However, for Mannheim the "ideological structure does not change independently of the class structure and the class structure does not change independently of the economic structure" ([1936] 1968:130). 

This sense of the "structural totality of society" Mannheim attributed to Marx. He built his theoretical system on the threefold structural tendencies of Marx's earlier body of thought: first of all, that the mode of material production shapes the political sphere (and the rest of the "superstructure"); second, that change in the material base is closely connected with "transformations in class relations" and corresponding shifts in power; and third, that idea structures may dominate people at any historical period, but that these ideologies may be understood and their change predicted theoretically.

Nevertheless, unlike Marx, who emphasized that the ideas of the ruling class prevailed, Mannheim held that class-divided societies contain a special stratum for "those individuals whose only capital consisted in their education" ([1936] 1968:156). As this stratum comes to draw from different classes, it will contain contradictory points of view. Hence, the social position of intellectuals is not merely a question of their class origin. Its "multiformity" provides the "potential energy" for members of the intellectual stratum to develop a social sensibility and to grasp the dynamic and conflicting forces of society ([1936] 1968:156-157).

Mannheim's conception of human science reflects a synthesis of idealism and materialism, spirit, and society (Wolff 1971:xiv). Kurt Wolff has identified Mannheim's fundamental question: How can social conditioning be reconciled with the "inexhaustibility and unforeseeability" of ideas and spirit? And as a corollary, how can spirit and society be saved? Mannheim believed that a sociology of knowledge would resolve this question and advance the discipline as a science. Above all, a sociology of knowledge would enable its user to realize a more accurate determination of the facts ([1936] 1968:296).  

Now, the task of a sociology of knowledge is not simply one of getting ride of bias, propaganda, or unrecognized values. Rather, even when knowledge is freed of all forms of "distortion," it will contain inherent "traces" that are an inevitable part of the structure of truth. For example, knowledge is never a matter of pure ideas that rise disembodied from their maker. It has implications for social action. Furthermore, it reflects the position in society of the knower as well as the corresponding events and dominant ideas of specific historical periods. Knowledge, even the scientific sort, does not exist in some separate sphere of truth. It is an intricate part of an altogether human process, bound up in the interrelationships of history, society, and psychology. Knowledge is truly of this world ([1936] 1968:292-309).